National Vanguard: Russia: the Bloody Insanity of We Can Repeat — part 2

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by Wolf Stoner
National Vanguard Russian correspondent

HAVING LEARNED ABOUT Soviet methods of warfare, one can’t help but wonder how they could be so callous to their own people. If the brutality toward conquered Europe could be rationalized somewhat by considerations of vengeance, the senseless slaughter of Russians by the Russian state seems utterly irrational and counterproductive. And it would be irrational and counterproductive if it were really a Russian state. Here again we see the ethnic origin of all political events. Absolutely everything that happens in the world has ethnic roots, however masterfully they might be concealed.

The ruling class in the USSR wasn’t Russian by any standard. It wasn’t Russian ethnically and it wasn’t Russian culturally. The Soviet rulers considered ethnic Russians to be a cheap, disposable commodity, easily and rapidly renewable. On these predatory precepts were based all policies, strategies, and battlefield tactics. Zhukov wasn’t an originator of this attitude; that Shabbos goy simply expressed what his masters thought.

Despite being utterly destructive and counterproductive in the long run, this method of total disregard for human costs was one of the two main causes of the Soviet victory in the Second World War (the other being help from America’s industrial might). That victory further validated these attitudes among the Soviet ruling class. It simply worked — and all other considerations were irrelevant. New generations of Soviet leadership were nurtured in this vein of thought. The only thing that matters is the target; any human cost is acceptable.

The most important thing for Western people to understand is the fact that nothing has changed since 1991 — nothing of substance, anyway. Russia is run largely by people with the same mentality. This system is self-replicating. It acquires new, resilient traits, but never changes its core substance. What we can see now on the battlefield is a re-run of what happened in World War 2. It could not be otherwise. Why would these leaders use any other strategies and tactics, if the old ones proved to be successful? The present-day Kremlin leadership isn’t as homogeneous as it was at the beginning of the Bolshevik “experiment,” but the entire set of attitudes put in place by Lenin’s government continues to be the holy writ and gold standard of statesmanship in Russia. A total disregard for human costs and the norms of morality is coupled with a readiness to transgress any laws and agreements.

The greatest mistake of most foreign observers is to perceive post-Soviet Russia as something different from the USSR. It is not different. The history of Putin’s Russia is a continuation of Soviet history — its terminal phase. Looked at from this point of view, all the actions of the Kremlin become understandable and predictable. Each time you need to know what Putin’s Russia would do in such and such a situation, simply ask yourself: What would Lenin do? The most atrocious and bloody variant is always the most likely one. This method of prediction works in most cases. For the same reason, Russian/Soviet judges always prefer to use maximal punishments.

The collective bloodthirstiness and desire to inflict maximum pain on anyone who is considered an enemy is the main defining feature of Soviet Man. The Soviet/Russian populace was remodeled after this fashion. Russians accept this attitude from the state as something normal, as a necessary prerequisite of state greatness. The idea of greatness without massive bloodshed is beyond their scope. The great leader always must produce a great shedding of blood, otherwise he could not be reckoned as great. Therefore, the idea that huge battlefield losses will somehow diminish Putin’s stature is incorrect. The more people who die, the greater the leader becomes. That is a default Soviet/Russian attitude.

Who is the most despised leader in Russia? Yes, Gorbachev. Why? Because he rejected the idea of great bloodshed. If he had started a war, like that going on now, and had sacrificed a few million Russians, he would be lying in the Mausoleum on Red Square and cities would be named after him. Yeltsin was more willing to spill blood, therefore he has more respect, but not enough to be considered a great statesman. Putin has learned this lesson well and decided to become really great.

The cult of death has become the religion of the USSR, regardless of what its creators envisaged. It frequently happens in history that the long-term consequences of social projects are totally different from what was expected.

Western observers consider high Russian battlefield losses to be a liability to Russian rulers, but in reality such losses are an asset. The greater the losses, the more justifications for war: “Look how many of our heroes died defending the Motherland! We must never give up! We must do everything for our victory!” This shift in narrative can be clearly detected in internal Russian propaganda, which attempts to portray Russia as a great martyr nation ready for its last stand against the Devil. The Russian populace is actively conditioned to accept great bloodshed. The holy status of the war precludes asking any questions about the validity of its causes, atrocities committed, losses, etc.

Psychological preparation for the current war has been going on for the last twenty years. The pitch of hysteria was constantly heightened. After 2014, it crossed the line which divides a normal society from an insane one. Since then, it has hardly been possible to reverse the trend. Everything that has happened since then was inevitable and predictable. The cult of victory in the Second World War has become a new and weird religion that has displaced most everything else. It is the alpha and omega of the whole Putinist society.

The most remarkable and ubiquitous slogan of this periodm 2014 to 2022, is “We Can Repeat,” accompanied by all kinds of anti-German posters, including quiteindecent ones. This obsessive desire to repeat the massive bloodshed and wholesale destruction of Europe has soaked the Russian collective mind, poisoning all social strata. This insanity goes both ways: from the top down and from the grassroots upward. The insane rulers encourage public insanity and, in turn, the collective hysteria of the crowds emboldens the rulers to ever more atrocious actions. The result is there for all to see — and it is only the beginning. As Putin said, “We haven’t even started yet.”

Crossing the River

The history of the battles on the Eastern Front in World War 2 is very important. Everyone interested in military affairs must study this history, for those battles were very different from those in other theaters of the war. The persistence with which the Soviet high command threw its troops into desperate attacks is unparalleled by anything else in history. In order to better understand this cannibalistic mentality and total disregard for human life, we need to look at one of the typical examples of this kind of military action.

Here I want to present an excerpt from a memoir by General Erhard Raus. It describes an episode that happened during the battle of Kursk, during the phase in which the Soviets started their counter-offensive. The tactical details of the battle are especially valuable and give a first-hand perspective on events.

The book’s title is Panzer Operations: the Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-45. This extract is from Chapter 9, ‘Belgorod and Kharkov’, page 216. The same chapter is published in the book, Kursk, the German View.

The 11th corps led by General Raus was defending a front sector to the south of Belgorod city, along the Severskii Donets river. In order to break through the German defenses, the Soviets needed to cross the river. Here is the description of the crossing:

The regiments of Major General Georg Postel’s 320th Infantry Division were situated approximately thirty kilometers south of Belgorod on the hills on both sides of A[ ] Brook valley, through which a highway ran westward of the big Belgorod-Kharkov rollbahn, and those of Lieutenant General Werner Forst’s 106th Infantry Division held a position directly north of them. Any Russian advance through this valley would quickly interrupt this vital line of communications, which placed a heavy responsibility on the battalions stationed on both sides of the valley to prevent such incursions.

Our tactical withdrawal to the eastern bank of the Donets on 22 July had so surprised the Soviets in this sector that they only cautiously and hesitantly felt their way forward to the river on 23 July. In the 320th Infantry Division’s sector the western bank of the Donets was much higher than the eastern, and — particularly at the junction of A[ ] Brook with the river — the terrain was swampy and covered with reeds. The Donets was not fordable at any point, and it seemed obvious that the Russians would have a difficult time forcing a breakthrough in this locality. During the day they would probably be able to hide along the eastern bank in the maze of trenches remaining from their battered former positions and in the innumerable shell craters, but they would be unable to move into the open without being identified and brought under fire by the German defenders.

The weapons of the 320th Infantry, from their well-concealed bunker positions, controlled the Donets River valley (which was very level along its entire extent of three to four kilometers) so effectively that it was impossible for the enemy to prepare a daylight attack. Our artillery and heavy weapons we positioned in the hills southwest of village B[ ], zeroing them in on a former bridge site and preparing them for nightfiring. Ridge 675, which afforded excellent visibility to the east, had been transformed into a virtually impregnable bastion. Shell-proof dugouts, deep shelters, and communications tunnels protected the gun crews there from Russian counterbattery fire. Exits from the tunnels that faced the river had been expertly camouflaged, with machine guns emplaced in these exits to command the river in case the enemy attempted a night crossing. Their fields of fire covered not only the potential bridge site but also concentration areas and approach routes on both banks of the Donets. Firing data for these weapons had been computed and carefully rechecked, while searchlights had been emplaced along the ridge to illuminate the immediate outpost area. The Russians lacked specific knowledge of these meticulous preparations but were fully aware that our troops had enjoyed ample opportunity to improve their defenses. As a result, a dead silence prevailed in the sun-drenched, glittering sand desert on the eastern bank of the Donets throughout the long summer days of late July.

The author then describes various methods of reconnaissance used by the Soviets in order to gain information about German defenses:

As a result of this intelligence, the enemy selected this point for his first attempt to cross the river. Fortunately, the men of the battalion positioned here had remained vigilant. They had identified and mined the tracks of the Russian scouting parties and had adjusted their machine guns and mortars on the crossing points used by these parties, so that the weapons were ready for night firing. Thus prepared, they kept a close watch on the river throughout the night of 31 July-1 August. As expected, just before dawn, several companies of Red Army troops appeared and commenced crossing the Donets at three previously reconnoitered points, utilizing improvised equipment. The mines that exploded and killed the first Russian soldiers to land on the western bank took them by complete surprise. The companies near the river on the eastern bank came under heavy, preregistered fire from machine guns and mortars, scattering in panic with heavy losses. Our artillery finished the job by shelling and destroying the river-crossing equipment they abandoned as soon as the sun rose.

General Postel and his troops did not make the mistake of thinking that the Russians would abandon their intention to force a crossing at this location because of a single setback. On the contrary, they repeated the attack on the night of 1-2 August, at the very same crossing sites, employing stronger forces and new equipment. General Postel decided not to interfere immediately but to deliver a decisive blow at the most critical moment. He ordered several batteries to mass their fire on the bridge site to smash the construction work after it had progressed sufficiently. At a prearranged time, just before midnight, all the guns fired upon the bridge site simultaneously and then ceased as abruptly as they had begun. Observers on the ridge made out the silhouette of a bizarre tangle of beams and pillars in the flickering light of burning lumber on the eastern bank of the river. The partially completed bridge was a shambles in the midst of which wounded men were screaming for help as shadows and scurrying figures (presumably medical aid men) moved among them.

Scarcely half an hour had passed when our observers reported that full-scale construction activity had resumed. The sounds of intensive hammering and sawing induced General Postel to order another concentration fired shortly after midnight. The result was equally devastating, though this time silence followed the bursts of our projectiles, a silence interrupted only by explosions from a few ammunition dumps that caught fire after sustaining direct hits. Yet the fires soon died down, and after only a brief interval the Russians again resumed their efforts as if nothing had happened. Obviously, the commander on the opposite shore had positive orders that his bridge had to be complete by dawn.

To frustrate this intention without wasting ammunition, General Postel ordered one 210mm howitzer battery to deliver intermittent harassing fire on the bridge site. Flash observation confirmed that the projectiles had landed on or very close to their targets. After an hour of harassment fire the pattern of Soviet response became clear. When a round did major damage it cause a prolonged work stoppage, but after a near-miss the hammering resumed immediately. General Postel therefore concluded that under these circumstances the Russians might still be able to complete the bridge by dawn, harassing fire notwithstanding.

He therefore decided to employ some of our hidden machine guns to rake the construction site at short intervals with bursts of fire. Judging by the screams of those who were hit, and the immediate suspension of the bridging operation, the rapid precision fire of these weapons had a devastating effect. Even so, the Russians still attempted to continue with the construction, but high losses forced them to slow down and finally quit the work entirely.

At periodic intervals, our heavy howitzers resumed harassing fire to discourage the Soviets from resuming their project and to complete the destruction. Only after daybreak was it possible for our observers to obtain a true picture of the results achieved during the hours of darkness. A horrific sight presented itself. Splintered rafters pointed skyward, and in between hung grotesquely mutilated corpses of the brave men who had scorned death in the effort to accomplish their mission. Even more mangled bodies were strewn about in a wide circle around the bridge site or lay partially submerged in the mud holes formed by shell craters. Smashed vehicles, dead horses, and all kinds of ammunition and equipment littered the area. Live Russians, on the other hand, seemed to have vanished from the scene of their failure.

That, however, wasn’t the end of the Soviet attempts to cross the river. They continued on the following days, but for us this is enough to see the methods and mindset of Soviet military leadership.

Now let’s look at more recent events. Seventy-nine years later, at the same river, Donets, only 200 kilometers south ofthe place where the Germans defended their positions, the modern Russian army again tried to cross this river — again using similar methods and showing the same obstinacy and utter disregard for their own losses.

On 8 May 2022, Russian combined arms units were gathered at the river bank. Pontoon bridges were being constructed. The higher command demanded quick victory before 9 May celebrations in Moscow. (This date is of semi-religious significance in Putin’s Russia.) Meanwhile, Ukrainian reconnaissance units had detected this concentration. The coordinates of the place were relayed to the Ukrainian command, which rapidly arranged a combined strike by fighter jets and all available artillery in the area. After a few hours of strikes, the four pontoon bridges were destroyed and at least 70 trucks and armored vehicles were destroyed or disabled. The number of killed personnel was impossible to evaluate, but certainly one battalion tactical group ceased to exist. Predictably, though, this didn’t deter Russian command from trying again to cross the river in the same place. On each day from 9 to 12 May, Russian forces tried to cross the river and construct bridges, and each time they were prevented by concentrated and precise Ukrainian artillery fire. After failing to cross the river and losing most of the equipment that was intended for a deep strike into the Ukrainian rear, the Russian command ordered a retreat on 13 May.

This example shows us that the modern Russian military leadership operates according to the same old principles. And it would be unwise to expect anything else as long as this neo-Soviet state continues to exist. But it must be noted that this time the Russian military will not be able to achieve the same spectacular results as it did in World War 2. The quality of the population is markedly worse than it was then. Modern Russians are mostly city dwellers with very high rates of alcohol and drug addiction as well as bad health. Back in Stalin’s time, Russians were mostly peasants accustomed to hard work, exposure to harsh weather, and privations of all kinds. Now such men are almost nonexistent. The only exceptions are the Asian tribesmen from the Siberian wilderness (who the Russian command actively uses) but their mental capacities are very limited, which prevents them from using complicated weapons systems and tactics.

Therefore, the Russian military leadership is in a quandary. It has reached a dead end from which there is no way out. It can’t retreat, and it can’t win. It is compelled by circumstances to continue more of the same, in order to buy time and hope for some favorable changes in the world. But the longer it persists, the worse will be the outcome. The situation will come to a point of no return, and, when it does, events will be determined by their own logic, not by any particular leader or country. In this sense, Russia has become an icebreaker that splits the globalist post-World War 2 system; not intentionally, but because of its own delusions.

The coming chaos opens the window for real changes. Any disruption of the existing equilibrium is welcome, because the status quo as it has been for the last 77 years is a death sentence for the White race.

Finis

Source: https://nationalvanguard.org/2023/03/russia-the-bloody-insanity-of-we-can-repeat-part-2/