Namibia (Formerly German South West Africa): President Sam Nujoma’s CIA Connections – Jew Kissinger CIA & KGB

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[Sam Nujoma is a communist terrorist, the same as the MPLA in Angola; the ANC in South Africa, Mugabe’s ZANU in Zimbabwe and the Frelimo in Mozambique.

This is an article that appears to be written by a black in Namibia. He is outraged that his commie leader seems to be hobnobbing with the USA. He also mentions the Jew Henry Kissinger as a CIA agent. What I still need to show you is the evicence that the Jew Henry Kissinger is actually a KGB agent as well! I’m convinced that Kissinger, like all Jews is more loyal to any communist power than to the USA. So don’t be fooled by the Jewish face of American foreign Policy.

Years ago on AfricanCrisis I exposed a very interesting, sneaky Jewish concept called “Moderation”. Its a topic we’ll return to later. But in a nutshell, the USA ends up supporting the same people that the communists and the Jews support. But the question is who does it really benefit? Its a sneaky backstabbing Jewish idea. But we’ll discuss it another day. Here’s the analysis regarding Nujoma.]

The shocking but not surprising exposé on pages 49 and 50 of a book titled My life with the SA Defense Force written by former South African (SA) Defense Minister Magnus Malan, has opened a whole can of worms about the Founding Father of the Nation and former Namibian President Sam Nujoma.
Please note once again that this analysis is written by me in my personal capacity about Mr. Nujoma alone in his personal capacity. This is not also about all SWAPO Party members. I have nothing to do with the reported internal power struggles within the SWAPO Party which, by the way, have been ongoing since its foundation on April 19 1959. This is not even about the SWAPO Party as an organization. Nor does my criticism of Nujoma form part and parcel of the alleged power struggle campaign leading up to the SWAPO Party Congress slated for later this year. However, if anyone wants to use this exposé in connection with the said Congress then there is nothing I can do about it!
My criticism of Nujoma is retaliation for all the insults, humiliations and character assassinations I had personally suffered from Nujoma. As you might have known, he had inter alia called me “a homosexual” and “a CIA agent”. I strongly resent and dismiss his absurd accusations! I have threatened to expose Nujoma and I am now making good of that threat. Local NBC Director General Bob Vezera Kandetu last August warned: “If you live in a glasshouse do not throw stones”.
In my previous exposé of Mr. Nujoma’s CIA connections I have tried to demonstrate that, during the Cold War era and at the height of anti-communist hysteria in the Western world, Nujoma had constantly associated himself with elements that were widely viewed as avidly anti-communist, conservative, right-wingers, neo-colonialist and neo-liberal as well as pro-Western. The beholders are people generally regarded as radicals, left-wingers, communists or associate elements. In Part 7 I have also referred to both direct and circumstantial evidence suggesting not only that Nujoma was himself a fervent anti-communist, but also that he had direct or indirect connections with several Western intelligence agency operatives. Intelligence consultants and operatives had been frontline soldiers in the bitter Cold War ideological confrontation that had erupted in the world in the aftermath of World War II.
In this Part 8 of my exposé of Nujoma’s CIA connections I will additionally expose inter alia Nujoma’s mysterious meetings with high-ranking SA intelligence chiefs. I will also explain to you my take about the significance and the timing of the said encounters. But before going into the subject, let me try to explain to you the meaning of the word “intelligence” and its significance.
“Intelligence” refers to any information, which has been secretly and cunningly acquired by someone about someone else or about an organization, such as SWAPO, with the view to undermine it or pre-empt the activities of such organization, to outmaneuver it or to eliminate some or all of its members.
In the context of this analysis, “intelligence” or “understanding how” is an activity focusing on the gathering, analysis, protection and dissemination of information, which policy makers, such as the President, Prime Minister or a country’s leaders require in order to secure the economic, financial, military, State safety and security of their country. Military intelligence (MI) focuses on the gathering, analysis, protection and dissemination of actionable intelligence information about the enemy and the environment or terrain as well as the weather in an area where enemy forces operate. MI is very closely related to reconnaissance which is the military term for the active gathering of information about an enemy by physical observation. Reconnaissance therefore is part of offensive or defensive military intelligence.

Allow me then also to tell you about some of the intelligence organizations and associated operatives with whom Nujoma had ties as well as their main purposes or functions. While I am not claiming to be an expert in these things, I will, nevertheless, use my own natural intelligence, plus the bits and pieces I had learned as a PLAN intelligence cadre and through the additional military training that I had received under SWAPO in the Soviet Union. This was made possible with courtesy of the Glavnoe Razvedyvatelnoe Upravlenie (GRU) or the Central Intelligence Directorate of that country.

What is CIA? Created under US President Harry Truman in 1947, the CIA is the principal external intelligence arm of the US Government. As a key element of US foreign policy, the CIA’s primary mission is to gather and analyze information about foreign governments, corporations, organizations as well as individuals and reporting such information to the various departments of the US Government. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) deals with the US’s internal intelligence operations. The CIA also conducts overt and covert information dissemination aimed at inter alia influencing current and potential leaders around the world, with the view to have them work in favor of US interests.

What is MI5 and MI6? MI5, or Military Intelligence (MI) Section 5, is the internal intelligence and security agency of the United Kingdom (i.e. Britain). MI5 is part of British intelligence machinery alongside MI6. Also known as the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), MI6 stands for Military Intelligence (MI) Section 6. MI6 is tasked with handling British external intelligence operations. MI5-MI6 does for the United Kingdom precisely what the FBI-CIA combination does for the US.

BOSS (or Bureau for State Security) and the Military Intelligence Division (MID) were the two main intelligence agencies of apartheid SA before Namibian independence. Like FBI-CIA and MI5-MI6, the BOSS- MID alliance had also carried out inter alia covert information gathering operations to promote in southern Africa the interests of apartheid SA regime and its Western allies.

Namibia’s best known intelligence agencies are the Namibian Central Intelligence Service (NCIS) in the Office of the President and Military Intelligence (MI) of the Namibian Defense Force (NDF) as well as the Special Branch of the Namibian Police.

Throughout the Cold War era the FBI-CIA, MI5-MI6 and BOSS-MID worked hand-in-glove against organizations and individuals considered as threatening Western economic and other interests. In his own book James Sanders extensively demonstrates that CIA and MI6-MI5 had exchanged intelligence information with SA intelligence agencies. Mr. Magnus Malan was trained in US by the CIA in counter-insurgency and counter-communism warfare.

Nujoma himself admits on page 388 of his book that Malan was one of “the top military brass [who had been] trained by the CIA in counter insurgency techniques”. Hence, Mr. Nujoma, like me, correctly sees no difference between the CIA, on the one hand, and apartheid SA intelligence outfits, such as the BOSS and MID, on the other? But then, why and how could it be possible that Nujoma only had close links with CIA agents or collaborators, such as Maurice Tempelsman, without similar ties with BOSS-MID agents or collaborators? This is impossible if this axiom of the Ovambo people were used as a pointer: “Your friend’s friend is also your friend”. If Mr. Nujoma is a very close friend of Maurice Tempelsman as has been shown in Parts 2 and 3 of this analysis, and Tempelsman has been a CIA agent, was Nujoma therefore also a CIA or a BOSS agent or collaborator? Is this not so simply because BOSS and CIA were friends and collaborators?

During the Cold War era the CIA and MI6 had provided apartheid SA with inter alia Marconi tropospheric scatter communications equipment to monitor PLAN movements in Angola. The US’s Department of Defense had also used NASA’s manned spacecraft tracking station near Bapsfontein, South Africa, for inter alia reconnaissance maps and other aerial intelligence inter alia to locate the positions and monitor the movements and of, among other things, SWAPO forces in southern Angola. BOSS-MID, CIA and MI6 had also worked together in counter-intelligence operations, including the detection and the arrest of GRU agent Commodore Dieter Gebhardt towards the end of 1982.

One very good example about how economic interests are being taken very seriously in the West is the US-led war in Iraq. This war has already led to the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives. The other very good example is Mr. Nujoma’s one-man decision to send NDF soldiers to the DRC and Angola in support of CIA-engineered wars for the vast oil and mineral reserves there. In the previous parts of this analysis I have already shown the deep involvement in the DRC war by Nujoma’s close confidante and economic advisor Maurice Templesman. Have you managed to watch the film Blood Diamonds yet? If you did not, please go and watch it!

I have hopefully now sufficiently explained what “intelligence” means and how it works as well as what the prime functions of the FBI-CIA, MI5-MI6 and BOSS-MID allies are. Now I will proceed with exposing Nujoma’s mysterious meetings with high-ranking SA intelligence chiefs and his associations with associated intelligence operatives throughout the Cold War ideological confrontation.
To start with, Mr. Nujoma himself admits in his book that, apart from his mysterious trip to Windhoek in March 1966 and his meetings there with inter alia Magnus Malan and other BOSS-MID elements, Nujoma had at least three other secret meetings with SA intelligence chiefs in exile. According to Nujoma, one such encounter took place in Lusaka, Zambia, shortly after the Cassinga massacre on May 4 1978! Yes, Mr. Nujoma had that clandestine meeting with chief of Staff Intelligence (CSI) General Neels van Tonder, MID kingpin General Joffel van der Westhuizen and General Herman. According to Nujoma, then Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, “who was always in contact with them”, arranged the meeting. General van Tonder, Nujoma says, headed the SA delegation. Had Kaunda “always” been “in contact with” SA intelligence chiefs? Who is General Herman?
The task of those SA intelligence chiefs, Mr. Nujoma says, “was to assess our political stand and attitude”. Can you hear? In intelligence parlance this means gathering human intelligence (HUMINT). This includes assessment of body language and whether or not Nujoma was willing to meet and reconcile with what he called “SA puppets”. This is how Nujoma had always derogatively referred to the leaders of the rival Internal Political Parties inside Namibia at the time. To me, of greater value about such clandestine meet was the timing. The meeting took place less than a month after the brutal SA military attack on Cassinga (i.e. “Moscow” and “Vietnam” bases). Many of Nujoma’s “fantastic lieutenants” and ordinary PLAN fighters as well as hundreds of civilians lost their lives in that attack. The term “fantastic lieutenants” came from Mr. Magnus Malan referring to the visionary and formidable SWAPO leaders and PLAN commanders.

The timing of the secret Lusaka meeting in May 1978 reminds me about Mr. Nujoma’s mysterious visit to Namibia in March 1966 apparently in order to inform SA intelligence chiefs about PLAN and other SWAPO activities. As I have previously pointed out, the Windhoek meeting also took place shortly after Nujoma had ordered Group 2 PLAN fighters into the country. These PLAN fighters, led by Leonard Philemon Nangolo (aka Castro), fell into ambush on March 26 1966 west of Rundu and, after a brief armed skirmish, the PLAN fighters were all arrested.

As a matter of fact, this was the first time, and NOT August 26 1966 as Nujoma claims, when PLAN fighters exchanged fire with SA security forces! Go to find out from Group 2 PLAN veteran Joseph Helao Shityuwete. Moreover, Nujoma acknowledges this fact on page 171 of his autobiography Where Others Wavered. Here is what Nujoma himself says about that battle:

“While in the Kavango district, [Group 2 PLAN fighters] had a direct engagement with the South African occupation forces near the Kavango River, west of Rundu. They suffered no casualties, but they believed that during the battle some enemy soldiers were killed and some were injured because the enemy soldiers were not able to take immediately follow-up action”.

There are the facts. As I have said, the true history of Namibia has yet to be told and written!

The Windhoek and Lusaka meetings between Nujoma and SA intelligence are chiefs also reminiscent of Nujoma’s April 1 1989 senseless ordering of more than 1 600 heavily armed PLAN fighters into country. This equally very puzzling incident had led to the butchering by SA forces of at least 300 PLAN soldiers. It is also significant to note here that Nujoma had sent these PLAN fighters into the country despite his “acceptance of the cessation of armed hostilities in and around Namibia between South Africa and SWAPO, in accordance with the Geneva Protocol of 5 August 1988”. I believe that the rationale behind Nujoma’s sending in of these PLAN fighters was that he was not sure about winning the UN-supervised elections in November 1989.

The second clandestine meeting between Nujoma and SA intelligence generals took place in May 1984 at State House in Lusaka, Zambia. This is how Nujoma himself describes it on page 342 of his book:

“In May 1984, President Kaunda, whose guest I was at State House in Lusaka, asked me if I would meet three South African generals who could speak for the South African government. When I showed interest, he said: ‘Well, they are in State House at this moment, waiting to see you.’”

And Mr. Nujoma enthusiastically met those generals. Do you hear again? By the way, why and what was Mr. Nujoma doing at the time in President Kaunda’s State House unless Kaunda had deliberately invited him and informed him well in advance about the encounter with the said SA generals? This time around, Nujoma says, MID supremo and counter-intelligence Chief General Joffel van der Westhuizen led the SA delegation.

My other question is: Was Nujoma by accident at State House? Is Mr. Nujoma implying that Kaunda had tricked him into this meeting and by saying that these generals were speaking on behalf of the SA government? It does not happen anywhere in the world except in case where a country was ruled by a military junta. This simply makes no sense! Normally, the military deals with military issues, while politicians deal with political affairs. Or was Nujoma merely trying to persuade the SA generals to stage a coup d’etat against P.W. Botha and his apartheid regime? It doubt whether Nujoma had that capacity!

The third clandestine rendezvous between Nujoma and SA intelligence and military generals took place in July 1984 in the Cape Verde Islands off the west coast of Africa. This time around Officer Commanding SA Defense Force (SADF) in Namibia, General Georg Meiring, and Administrator General (AG), Mr. Willie van Niekerk, led the SA delegation. That meeting apparently went so well such that Mr. Nujoma would say this to AG Willie van Niekerk:

“You must keep my house warm for me!”

My what? My house? What a very serious joke! Does this not suggest that Nujoma might have received prior assurances from “the Boers” that he will become the first Namibian president in return for him ensuring that SWAPO would never be taken over by Nujoma’s progressive and “formidable lieutenants”? Or since when and how did Mr. Nujoma know that the State House was or would become his? This Nujoma “you-must-keep-my-house-warm-for-me” talk really baffles me. It also reminds me what Nujoma had to say on a different occasion about that very same State House. Hear this:

“It is interesting to recall how, early in the morning of 21 March 1966, I was driven past the Administrator’s house as a prisoner being deported from my own country. Now I live in that same house, the State House, as the first President of the Republic of Namibia.”

What prophecy and dream come true come March 21 1990! Again, this to me also suggests that, through the secret dealings with either SA intelligence agencies or through his CIA connection through among others Mr. Maurice Tempelsman, Nujoma might have already been promised the presidency of Namibia in exchange for him preventing SWAPO from being taken over by his the “fantastic lieutenants”. Because these “fantastic lieutenants” might threaten Western economic and other interests in Namibia. The principle behind this is that: ‘The devil that you know is always better than the angel that you do not know’. Remember what Nujoma also had to say about the prime objective of Henry Kissinger’s mid-1970 ‘shuttle’ diplomacy and US policy for Namibia on pages 123 and 278-279 of his book? This is what Nujoma inter alia says:

“Saving the whites and ensuring unhindered and continued access to raw materials, strategic minerals and sea lanes was clearly the rescue mission that brought Henry Kissinger to southern Africa, not self-determination, independence and human rights of the black majority”.

James Sanders also says that way back in the mid-1970s the CIA and SA intelligence had found it “essential to pick potential leaders early, and get to know them so that when they got into position of influence you had a friend there”. BOSS Chief General Hendrik van den Bergh had since 1976 also held a similar view that SWAPO, under Nujoma, would become victorious in Namibia. Hence, General van den Bergh had even proposed to Prime Minister John Vorster that the apartheid SA regime “should facilitate SWAPO’s coming to power to preserve SA mineral interests in [an independent Namibia]”.

Evidence also shows that Mr. Nujoma had close ties in Tanzania and in Britain with inter alia BOSS agents. The best example was Hans Lombard. In his own book, Nujoma admits that Lombard was a BOSS agent. In March 1966 Lombard had booked a hotel room for Mr. Nujoma. Lombard then invited Nujoma to a party in his (i.e. Lombard’s) London flat. As Nujoma was dancing, wining and dining with Lombard and others in the flat, another BOSS or MID agent went to Nujoma’s hotel room and “stole” his briefcase packed with PLAN secrets! As I have already pointed out earlier, the content of Mr. Nujoma’s now famous briefcase, including all the PLAN military plans he had been carrying around, was used to track down and arrest virtually all the PLAN soldiers who had been operating in the country in 1966. It had also been used by SA prosecutors as the prime and decisive evidence in the marathon 1967-1968 trial and the subsequent conviction on charges of terrorism and communism of Mr. Herman Toivo ya Toivo and 36 other Namibian nationalists.

If one invites only one’s friends to your party, then Nujoma was Lombard’s friend. And since birds of the same feather flock together, was Nujoma not an ally of BOSS of some sort? I sincerely believe that had it been me, Nujoma would have pointed to the Lombard affair as “smoking gun evidence” that Phil ya Nangoloh was a directly a BOSS and or indirectly a CIA agent.

Common sense however suggests that this evidence might have already been handed over on a golden platter to SA intelligence chiefs during Nujoma’s surprise visit in Windhoek in March 1966. Mr. Sam Nujoma tells you that he did not “cooperate” with his “captors” in March 1966. Why then had Nujoma not been tortured like Herman Toivo ya Toivo, Leonard Philemon Nangolo “Castro”, Louis Nelengani and Joseph Helao Shityuwete and many others? The essence of torturing a captive is to force her or him to cooperate. By the way Nujoma ought to have known better: because of the rationale behind the brutal torture of the Lubango dungeon victims. Just go and ask PLAN Commander Johannes “Mistake” Gaomab and Namibian Police Commissioners Des Shilunga and Samuel Hoabeb as well as Nujoma’s brother-in-law and Namibian billionaire Aaron Mushimba, to mention just a few.
Hence, I am of the opinion that when Magnus Malan and Theo Crous “arrested” Nujoma the latter cooperated fully with his “captors” and had given all the military and other damaging intelligence information about PLAN and SWAPO to Malan and company.

Do you still remember that I have said that Dr. Kissinger came to southern Africa in the mid-1970 and that he and Mr. Nujoma had met privately in Kissinger’s Hotel room in New York on September 29 1976? Kissinger is also a CIA officer in his own right.

What might have been the rationale behind, and the possible consequences of, these clandestine contacts between Nujoma and the above-mentioned SA intelligence operatives? Now my question about all these secret meetings is: What really was the objective and what exactly did Mr. Nujoma hope to gain there from? The implication seems to be very clear. In Part 9, I will tell you what these are.

1) “Intelligence Interregnum & the MID Solution: Apartheid’s Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa’s Secret Service op.cit. p.120-173
2) see Magnus Malan in “The American experience: My Life With the SA Defense Force”, Protea Book House, Pretoria, 2006, p.42-46
3) see “Final Days of the Struggle for Independence”, Where Others Wavered: Autobiography of Sam Nujoma”, Panaf, 2001, p.388
4) “Marconi case: Apartheid’s Threat To Word Peace”` p.12, www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/aam/abdul-9.html
5) “Pretoria Centre of the Astronomical Society of Southern Africa”, http://www.pretoria-astronomy.co.za/louisbarendse.htm
6) “South African military build-up in Namibia—an explanation?: Where Others Wavered, p.272
7) “South African military build-up in Namibia—an explanation?: Where Others Wavered”, p.272
8) “Never Follow The Wolf: The Autobiography of a Namibia Freedom Fighter, Kliptown Books, London, 1990, p. 124-130
9) see “SWAPO’s REPLY, Nujoma’s Letter addressed to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, March 18 1989: Where Others Wavered, p.450
10) “Clumsiness and duplicity: Where Others Wavered”, op.cit. p.342
11) see Hilton Hamann “Days of the Generals: The Untold Story of South Africa’s Apartheid-era Military Generals”, Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2001, p.79
12) see Sam Nujoma in “Where Others Wavered: The Autobiography of Sam Nujoma”, Panaf, 2001, p.141
13) see Hilton Hamann in “Dirty Tricks’: Days of the Generals: The Untold Story of South Africa’s apartheid-era Military Generals”, Zebra Press, 2001, p.151
14) “US Policy towards Namibia in the 1970s and 1980s: Where Others Wavered” op.cit. p. 278
15) “Muldergate: A Quite Coup: Apartheid’s Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa’s Secret Service”, John Murray Books, London, p.95
16) “Coup and Counter-coup: Apartheid’s Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa’s Secret Service”, John Murray Books, London, p. 110-111
17) see“The Hague Court—A ‘Mockery of Justice’: Where Others Wavered”: Autobiography of Sam Nujoma, Panaf , 2001, p.145
18) see Gordon Winter in “Hans Lombard: Inside Boss, South Africa’s Secret Police, An ex-spy’s Dramatic and Shocking Expose”, Penguin Books, London, 1981, p.316
19) see Peter Katjavivi in “The 1967-8 Terrorism Trial: A History of Resistance in Namibia”, Unesco Press, Paris, 1988, p.62
20) see James Sanders, “Apartheid’s Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa’s Secret Service”, John Murray Publishers, 2006, p. 58; see also Gordon Winter in “Hans Lombard: Inside BOSS: South Africa’s Secret Police”, Penguin Books, London, 1981, p. 318

Source: http://www.nshr.org.na/index.php?module=News&func=display&sid=696