White Identity Politics by Greg Johnson, Part 1 of 2

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Since he founded the Counter-Currents website over ten years ago Greg Johnson has been one of the most prolific writers in what I would call the “pro-White” movement, and since his active involvement began some ten years before that it is probably safe to regard him as one of the “Old Hands.” Most of his output has appeared originally in the form of essays and lectures, many of which have been compiled into a series of books. The first seven chapters of his latest work, White Identity Politics, are a compilation of lectures from 2018–2020. The eighth and last, “The Uppity White Folks Manifesto,” was written especially for this volume. Johnson is a master at describing the many facets of our problem and their effects both proximate and ultimate, and this mastery is on full display here. He is also a fertile source of ideas on the important subject of solutions, which he appropriately saves for the end.

One of the continuing problems within the pro-White movement is the term or label we choose for ourselves and our ideas. There has been a series of labels that have come and gone, with “Alt-Right” being the best known recent example. Our antagonists, of course, have many labels for us, usually employed as ill-defined epithets, with “racist,” “white supremacist,” “neo-Nazi,” “anti-Semite” and “hater” being among the most common. Whatever we choose to call ourselves is also adopted by our antagonists, who redefine it into yet another term of opprobrium. That is why I try to limit my self-labeling to mutually consistent phrases that are self-defining, and thus much more resistant to misunderstanding or misrepresentation, such as pro-White, White Preservationist, or White Separatist, but these phrases lack the emotive resonance or “catchy zing” we would like to have in the name of our movement.

Greg Johnson has for some years labeled his position as “White Nationalism,” a label also adopted by many other movement writers. Unfortunately, White Nationalism has become another term of invective and condemnation, and even of accusation as it is added to law enforcement’s list of supposed terrorist threats. More recently, as shown in these essays, Johnson has labeled his message as “white identitarianism.” This label is associated with the leading pro-White movement in Europe, where it has recently begun to suffer from a campaign of delegitimization, demonization and suppression, but in America it is still new enough to be relatively free of preconceptions. Johnson seeks to link White identitarianism with the populist movement that has surged with the Trump phenomenon and Brexit into the primary opposition to the establishment and its globalist agenda, with many aspects that are consistent with White interests, and so at least implicitly pro-White. The main threat to this goal is what Johnson discerns as establishment conservative efforts “to coopt national populism and channel its energies into establishment conservatism. This is what befell the Trump administration and the MAGA movement.” (p. 2)

At the beginning of the first chapter, Johnson notes that White identity politics subjected to condemnation and censure.

The biggest political taboo today is against white identity politics. … If you organize as a white person for white people, if you speak as a white person for the interests of white people, and especially if you’re willing to act in the political realm for the interests of white people, that is crossing the line into thoughtcrime. (p. 8)

The main threat to White identity politics, as to the populism Johnson seeks to link it with, is from establishment conservatism and its long but unproductive history of implicit White identity politics.

Implicit white identity politics, as practiced by conservative parties, is basically a swindle. They will “dog whistle” to us, meaning that they will signal in an oblique way that they understand our racial anxieties. They will propose universalistic legislation that “just so happens” to coincide with our interests as white people. But they’ll never explicitly court us. Indeed, if you accuse them of being interested in preserving the white race, they will angrily denounce you. They will do anything to avoid the stigma of standing up for their own people. (p. 10)

Considering the scale of our problem is one of continued existence, implicit is just not up to the job. “[I]n terms of long-term survival, we have to go explicit.” (p. 15)

This is how Johnson summarizes his own position and how it relates to the populist constituency he terms “uppity white folks,” who in many respects seem to overlap with those Sam Francis called “Middle American Radicals.”

I am a white separatist, meaning that I want to live in a racially homogeneous society rather than a multiracial society. I want racially homogeneous homelands for all peoples, to the extent that is possible … . Uppity white folks are white people who are content— for now—to live in a multiracial, multicultural society but who are going to take their own side in ethnic conflicts. Uppity white folks are the largest group practicing white identity politics. They tend toward the implicit rather than the explicit end of the spectrum. They tend to be politically moderate. They aren’t willing to entertain radical new policies just yet. … [T]hey are increasingly open to explicit talk of white identity and interests, as long as it is reasonable, moderate, fair to all parties, and not freighted with foreign symbols and ideologies. Uppity white folks are where white identity politics is growing. They are the people we can agitate and radicalize. The Left thinks that the tens of millions of white people who voted for Donald Trump are uppity white folks. That’s an exaggeration, of course. But the Trump electorate is definitely our target audience. (pp. 11–12)

In a sub-section titled “White Identity Politics is Moral,” Johnson gives a discourse on the importance of morality in political matters that is unique to whites.

The biggest question that we must deal with before people are going to accept white identity politics is not whether it is inevitable or whether it is necessary but whether it is right. People will refuse to bow to the inevitable if they think that’s the wrong thing to do. They will refuse to do what is necessary if they think that’s the wrong thing to do. White people are highly conscientious. That’s one of our strengths. … But that is also a great weakness if people can hack our conscientiousness and turn our moral fervor and moral idealism against our interests. That is basically what is driving white dispossession today. So we have to know that white identity politics is moral. (pp. 16–17)

I myself have stressed the importance of morality since I began writing, both the morality of our goal and the morality of our actions, or methods and means. I addressed the former in my essay “The Moral Battle” and the latter in a much earlier essay in the August 1989 issue of Instauration titled “Creating a Moral Image” Johnson has repeatedly addressed the latter in a standard essay condemning counterproductive acts of violence which he posts whenever one of these acts occurs, merely changing the names, locations and other details of the particular event. Kevin MacDonald has repeatedly analyzed and addressed the evolutionary origins of our unique morality, most comprehensively in his recent book Individualism and the Western Liberal Tradition.[1] In brief, our unique sense of morality, as well as individualism and objectivity, is a product of our remote ancestors’ evolutionary adaptation (both cultural and genetic) to the particular conditions of their existence in northern Europe. We now live in very different conditions, but that our tendencies toward establishing moral communities, and toward individualism and objectivity are still in us, part of us, as selected over many millennia by the pressures of survival. In multiracial conditions we coexist with races who evolved in very different environments, where groups were selected to have a very different sense of morality—morality as beneficial to the ingroup—as well as collectivist social structures and subjectivity. In such multi-racial conditions our sense of morality, individualism and objectivity place us at a disadvantage. But we cannot change them, nor should we want to, for we would no longer be us, no longer the creators of the unique civilization those traits enabled us to create. We must accept it as it is and work with it, to turn it to our advantage and make it a source of strength rather than vulnerability.

In his critique of multiculturalism—the euphemism for multiracialism he employs in this collection, he emphasizes the importance of “collective self-actualization,” which is best realized in homogeneous rather than diverse societies.

When a people is free to express its collective identity, it stamps its identity on the public realm….it creates a homeland. A homeland is … a realm of shared meaning, in which people understand one another, feel comfortable with one another. … This is why multiculturalism cannot really work. Cultures with opposed conventions cannot exist comfortably in the same system. … Multicultural societies basically force you to either fight constantly with other groups about conflicting values and customs, or stop caring about them, so you don’t fight. … Multiculturalism creates a society in which everyone feels alien. That’s no way to live. … We have a right to a land where we feel at home, where we are comfortable … where we can understand and trust strangers because, in the end, they’re not all that strange. So, from the point of view of collective self-actualization, we need to own up to our ethnic identities and ethnocentric preferences. Then we need to create ethnically homogeneous homelands where we are free to be ourselves. In short, white self-actualization requires white identity politics. (pp. 23–25)

One wonders why Johnson, who is talking about race, as made clear by the reference to “white” in the last sentence, uses the euphemism multiculturalism instead of multiracialism. This is not typical of his work. As these essays came from lectures, I suspect he considered the term more appropriate for his Norwegian, Swedish and Lithuanian audiences, where the racial threat is largely from non-European Caucasian (NEC) Islamic invaders whose cultural differences pose a very serious additional problem to their racial problem, but a footnote explaining this would have been helpful, as the difference between the two terms is important. Multiculturalism is the term used by those who refuse to recognize the existence of different or multiple races and claim that we are all one single race. If race does not exist then the problem is merely cultural—not racial, not physical, not biological, and not genetic, and therefore not existential in importance and scale, and thus totally different and far less serious.

But the problem is a racial one, and therefore biological, genetic and existential, and much more serious. If we had just one culture, as we effectively had before 1965, we would still have essentially the same racial problem. In Gunnar Myrdal’s very influential book An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (1944) he clearly and correctly defined the problem as racial. The term multiculturalism came into vogue with the postwar rise of the Boasian school of cultural anthropology which denies the importance or even the existence of race and minimizes or trivializes the problem to one that is not racial or existential. I took upper division courses in both physical and cultural anthropology and they are very different things. The latter is ideologically loaded with the dogma and agenda of cultural relativism and egalitarianism that devalues Western civilization, while the former, at least in 1970, focused on the physical facts of racial, biological, genetic and evolutionary reality.

Ultimately, the problem is based on the threat and reality of racial intermixture and its destructive effects on the White race, with the result of changing or shifting its genotype and phenotype in the direction of the races with which it mixes. Thus, ultimately, the problem is a matter of White racial preservation. This was Jefferson’s concern when he asserted that the non-White population “must be removed beyond the reach of admixture.” It was the concern Lincoln addressed when he asserted his support for racial separation as “the only perfect preventative of amalgamation,” which he later made clear—as he explained in a meeting with Black leaders—meant living in separate countries. It was the concern of Southern Whites when they instituted the “Jim Crow” system of racial segregation and White control called White Supremacism. It was the concern of Lothrop Stoddard, Theodore Bilbo and countless other Whites who care or have cared for the preservation or continued existence of their race in its existing form. In every intuitive, rational, logical, subjective and objective sense they have understood that different races inhabiting the same territory eventually intermix into a single blended race. And all the historical and genetic evidence indicates they were right—that populations sharing the same territory will blend together into a racially mixed or hybridized population, as has been recently reaffirmed by Harvard geneticist David Reich (2019, 43), who states

[W]hen one population moves into a region occupied by another population with which it can interbreed, even a small rate of interbreeding is enough to produce high proportions of mixture in the descendants.[2]

Therefore, to advocate or accept a population that is part non-White, in whatever proportion, is to advocate or accept that the population that ultimately results from their blending will be that proportion non-White. To accept a population that is 5% non-White is to accept the White race becoming 5% non-White, and accepting a 10% non-White population would mean the White race would become 10% non-White, a 5% or 10% shift away from being us and toward being them. Such a genetic shift is racially destructive and hence anti-White. The European-American population’s current genetic average is 98.6% European, or 1.4% non-European, with 94% of European-Americans having no genetically measurable non-European ancestry. (3)

After a 5% mixture with non-Caucasians, we would not really have a White race in the European sense of the term. So if we don’t want our race to become 5%, 10% or more non-European then we must not allow our country to be 5%, 10%, or more non-European. That is why Enoch Powell’s 1968 “Rivers of Blood” speech, made when Britain was still less than 5% non-White, had such an emotional impact.

Returning to the subject of morality, Johnson focuses on the concept of universality, which holds that true standards of morality should apply equally to everyone.

[T]he idea that true moral principles are universal has a great deal of intuitive appeal. If something is true, that means it is true for everyone. If something is right, that means it is right for everyone. Immanuel Kant argued that a principle is not moral unless you can will it to be a universal law. … But there is nothing un-universalizable about the principle that you take care of your own first, and you let other people take care of their own first. There is nothing un-universalizable about the principle of individuals and groups actualizing their unique potentials for excellence and letting other individuals and groups do the same. (p. 26)

Western political morality and ideology has elevated the most fundamental interests of the individual to the status of rights, with the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness or well-being even being regarded as “unalienable” and God-given. A race has interests that are similar to those of an individual, most importantly including life, liberty and well-being—or continued existence, control of its own existence, and what Johnson terms “flourishing.” The essence of pro-racial morality and ideology is the recognition and extension of these same interests and rights of individuals to races. So long as this is applied equally to all races, with all races allowed the same rights to continued existence and control of their own existence in their own separate homelands or countries, this pro-racial morality, that is pro-racial preservation and independence, is fully consistent with the principle of moral universality. This kind of universal morality, that recognizes the interests of races and nations as well as individuals, would recognize as universal the right of every race and nation to existence and control of its own existence.

But the world really works more on the basis of competing interests, at the level of both the individual and the group, than on the principles of morality and rights. And the group interests of non-Whites within White countries are diametrically opposed to the group interests of the White population, to the extent of dispossessing, subjugating, replacing and inevitably destroying them and their existence, without respect for the universality of equal interests, but denying or condemning White interests that stand in their way.

Johnson discusses the universalist moral concepts of fairness and the golden rule, and their relation to Identitarian principles. (pp. 28–30) Again, in actual practice these are moral concepts and values followed by Whites acting against their interests but not reciprocated by non-Whites. And what happens when these concepts conflict with vital or even existential racial interests, such as independence or even continued existence? That is where a line should be clearly drawn. But short of that line, the rules of fairness should be our guide, provided the same rules apply equally to everyone, reciprocated rather than taken advantage of and exploited to our disadvantage.

The basic Identitarian principle is to plant one’s flag and say, “This country is ours; this is our homeland; invaders and colonists must leave.” There is nothing unfair about that, because the invaders and colonists have homelands of their own.

But the current situation, in which whites—and only whites—are being asked to accept replacement levels of immigration from the Third World, while Third Worlders keep their homelands, is totally unfair. What’s theirs, they keep. What’s ours is negotiable. That’s a morally outrageous proposition. Repatriating invaders and colonists is not, however, unfair, because at the end of the process, everyone has a homeland.

There are good and bad kinds of nationalism. Bad nationalists seek to secure the sovereignty of their own people, but they are willing to deny the sovereignty of other peoples. They refuse to treat others the same way they wish to be treated. They defend their own but do not allow others to do the same. They create a world of oppressors and the oppressed. … Good nationalists believe in nationalism for all nations. They treat other peoples as they would like to be treated themselves. (p. 29–30)

Johnson turns to the ethical theory of Consequentialism to further buttress his case for identitarianism, asserting “We should justify moral principles by their consequences.” The consequences of the moral principles of multiracialism are anti-White, ultimately to the point of White racial extinction.

Under the present … order, all white nations are in demographic decline. If this decline is not reversed, whites will cease to exist as a distinct race. What would reverse these alarming demographic trends? … Suffice it to say that governments would have to make white preservation and flourishing the overriding goal of public policy. (p. 30)

Johnson even appeals to the longer-term and larger-scale best interests of non-Whites by arguing that the continued existence of Whites is in the best interests of the non-Whites themselves, because of Whites’ civilizational and scientific capabilities—capabilities that which all races benefit from. “If we want to save the world we have to save the whites.” (p. 31) But in their focus on their own group interests, non-Whites tend to be far too subjective, and thus far too lacking in the objectivity required to grasp this concept.

Regarding the significance of race, Johnson states that “we’re part of one great genetic continuum going all the way back to the Ice Age and before,” an observation that provides the context to appreciate the enormity of the historically very sudden White racial dispossession, replacement and destruction that is now occurring. (p.10)

[T]he distances between the great continental races and subraces—whites, blacks, Asians, Amerindians, non-European Caucasians, Australoids, and Capoids—are significant enough that radically different forms of societies suit them, which means that societies with multiple races suffer from conflicts that do not afflict racially homogeneous societies. … This is why some globalists declare that we will have a stable global society only when all racial and cultural differences have been erased. … Thus to construct a single world state, they wish to construct a single, mongrelized humanity. So much for diversity. … [I]nstead of destroying all existing peoples to create a world state, we wish to preserve all of them by giving them their own sovereign ethnostates. (pp. 38–39)

In reply to those like David Reich who claim that historical racial intermixture, even if it occurred many thousands of years ago, justifies current and future intermixture and delegitimizes preservationist opposition to it, Johnson states that “Race-mixing in the past is never an argument for increasing diversity in the present. In fact, one reason race-mixing took place in the past is to overcome the problems of diversity, i.e., of multiple races living in the same society.” (p. 39)

The idea that a nation is a pure social construct means that kinship is not an essential characteristic of nationhood. In concrete terms, that implies that the French people are no longer essential to the enterprise known as France. The French people are replaceable by foreigners, as long as their replacements pay lip-service to the designs of the ruling elite. Cultural and credal forms of nationalism are organically connected to race replacement. … When elites define you as replaceable, that’s because they intend to replace you. (p. 43)

In a subsection by that title, Johnson introduces “Love of One’s Own” (p. 46) as the force that makes identity politically potent, making a people “willing to assert itself, to take its own side in a fight.” Willingness to fight is the third pillar of white identity politics that gives it “its fighting spirit.” This is similar to what I call “wanting my race to live.”

Johnson describes his concept of racial love:

We don’t love our race because it is the best but because it is ours. And unlike chauvinists and supremacists, we can love our own without denigrating others who love their own as well. Indeed, we can understand why they do so, and neither party need feel threatened by the other. (p. 53)

None of this is visible to the modern liberal. … From that point of view, there are no nations. … They have no homelands … and human borders are illegitimate.

In practice, this means that all men are interchangeable, which means that you are replaceable with foreigners. The Great Replacement is merely the political expression of a world-destroying blindness … : the decision to see the world—and ourselves—as merely a stockpile of interchangeable resources.

The globalists have not refuted nationalism. They are simply blind to us and our concerns. When confronted with human differences, they airily declare that they do not matter. Identitarians beg to differ. In fact, we insist on it. In fact, we’ll fight to preserve our differences.

The answer to the Great Replacement is simply to say “No.” We will not jump into the melting pot. We veto the globalist dream. (p. 53–54)

I would develop the concept of racial love a bit further. Emotions and values can supersede socially and politically constructed moral codes and ideologies. Loving, valuing and caring for our race, and so wanting it to live and be free, can be used to supersede constructed anti-race and anti-White moralities that conflict with these emotions and construct a new pro-race and pro-White morality consistent with them, which could be applied universally to and by all races. Constructing such a morality, and instilling it in as many Whites as possible, could arguably be regarded as our most important task, the foremost mission of what Johnson, following Houston Steward Chamberlain, terms metapolitics (p. 131), but could also be described as the “winning of White hearts and minds.” A pro-race morality would extend the same interests and rights to life, liberty and well-being to races as it does to individuals. It would recognize the right of every race to its own homelands and self-rule, and regard any kind or degree of multiracialism as immoral and evil.

Why is multiracialism immoral and evil under a pro-race morality? Because it is an engine of racial destruction, the destroyer of races. More specifically, from our perspective as a race suffering multiracialist destruction, because it is contrary to the most fundamental White interests of racial preservation and independence, meaning our continued existence and control of our own existence. The pro-race and pro-White morality and ideology we need to instill in our people is simply that pro-White is moral and good and anti-White is immoral and evil. Multiracialism is diametrically opposed to and destructive of the most vital or life-essential White interests. It is therefore anti-White in the ultimate degree, and therefore it is immoral and evil. An effectively monoracial or all-White society protects and preserves the existence of the White race and is therefore pro-White, and therefore moral and good. The essence of this morality and ideology, and its attitude toward our race, could be summarized in the four words “love, value, preserve and protect.” We preserve and protect that which we love and value, so the love and value come first and the preserve and protect naturally follow.

In an essay titled “The Very Idea of White Privilege” (p. 55ff) Johnson addresses the false concepts of “white privilege,” “white fragility,” and “systemic white racism.” He deconstructs so-called “white privilege” as just more racial gaslighting, as is the concept of “white fragility” to describe those who deny it. He shows how fifteen of the fifty examples of “white privilege” listed in Peggy McIntosh’s 1989 essay which began it all “are simply aspects of having a homogeneous homeland.” Another fourteen examples can be “described as the absence of the disadvantages of being black.” He describes black social delinquency, criminality, and racial IQ differences in sufficient detail to refute the claims that systemic racism is the cause of Black problems.

Having brought up the concept of having a homogeneous homeland, perhaps the object of desire Johnson has referred to elsewhere as “a nice white country,” he warms to the subject:

Every human being deserves a home, where he can be himself free of the interference of others. But we should feel at home outside our front doors as well. We should be able to live among people who share our language and values, our history and destiny, the whole litany of “white privileges.” We don’t just need homes. We need homelands. Not alienating, bewildering, multicultural bazaars. … There is no moral imperative to destroy our homelands to accommodate strangers….This planet is big enough for all races and nations to have places they can call their own. This is the ethnonationalist version of utopia. (p. 67-68)

The goal of linking populism and White racial identitarianism appears to be the main focus of this compilation, with the earlier essays laying the groundwork and the essay “In Defense of Populism” beginning our journey into the matter itself with a description of the anti-White establishment’s reaction to it.

The populist uprisings of 2016—Brexit and the election of Donald Trump—aren’t epochal events like the revolutions of 1789 and 1848. Not yet anyway. But you wouldn’t know that judging from the panic that swept through Western political elites. … Populism seeks to rescue popular government from corrupt elites. (pp. 69–70)

Johnson notes that populism is distinct from White identity politics, although both are opposed to the existing liberal elites and their globalist order. But the two do sometimes overlap, and they do “complement one another, so that the strongest form of white identity politics is populist, and the strongest form of populism is identitarian.” (p. 70) Identitarianism has an ethnic conception of peoplehood that is based on “blood,” i.e., race. A civic conception is a pure social construct “that seeks to impose unity on a society composed of different ethnic groups. … Ethnic nationalism draws strength from unity and homogeneity.” (p. 72)

Civic nationalism, on the other hand, draws its strength from an imposed civic ideology which could be based on multiracialism, diversity and inclusion.

Why do populists need to appeal to white identity? It all comes down to what counts as the people. Is the people at its core an ethnic group, or is it defined in purely civic terms? Populists of the Right appeal explicitly or implicitly to identitarian issues. Populists of the Left prefer to define the people in civic or class terms and focus on economic issues. Since … both identitarian and economic issues are driving the rise of populism, populists of the Right will have a broader appeal because they appeal to both identity and economic issues. The great task of white identitarians today is to destroy the legitimacy of civic nationalism and push the populism of the Right toward explicit white Identitarianism. … Liberalism triumphed not by rejecting popular sovereignty but by subverting it. This is one reason the elites are so hysterical about the rise of populism. It puts them on the spot. If they affirm popular sovereignty, then populism is the only logical outcome. (pp. 81–82)

In the next essay, “National Populism is Here to Stay” (p. 83ff) Johnson claims that National Populism, which combines populism with implicit White identitarianism, is the wave of the future. What matters to the ultimate fate of the White race is that this “National Populism” moves in the direction of explicit White Racial Populism and becomes a vehicle for White racial interests.

Johnson next discusses “the Four D’s”—the four trends that contribute to the rise of national populism: distrust, destruction, deprivation and dealignment. Ethnonationalists “must exploit and intensify the existing tendency towards distrust of the establishment.” (p. 87) And Johnson lists ways this can be done.

I think our most important role is less in raising consciousness than in deepening consciousness. We have explanations of why multiculturalism creates alienation and conflict. We can explain who is behind globalization, immigration, and multiculturalism and why. We defend the moral legitimacy of white identity politics against the widespread notion that white identity politics, and only white identity politics, is immoral per se. That moral taboo is the great dam holding back the tide of national populism. If we can breach that dam, it will unleash the flood-waters of white identity. Finally, we can offer workable and humane alternatives, not just Right-wing civic nationalism, which basically is just lying about diversity in a different way. (pp. 91–92)

Regarding deprivation, “to reverse globalization, national populists need to overthrow the existing elites and institute protectionist economic policies. We need to reindustrialize the First World.” (p. 92)

Destruction refers to the destruction of identity through multicultural (i.e., multiracial) and immigration policies imposed by elites on the population. “National populists, however, promise to restrict immigration and preserve distinct national identities from multicultureal erosion.” (p. 89) It’s therefore noteworthy that all of the destructive changes we see have been enacted by elites, often in the teeth of popular opposition. As MacDonald noted in The Culture of Critique, “the sea change in immigration policy in the Western world occurred at approximately the same time (1962–1973), and in all countries the changes reflected the attitudes of elites rather than the great mass of citizens. … A consistent theme has been that immigration policy has been formulated by elites with control of the media and that efforts have been made by political leaders of all major parties to keep fear of immigration off the political agenda.” Otis Graham (Unguarded Gates, 2004: 88) corroborates this for the U.S. in the context of debate over the 1965 immigration law: “There was emerging on the immigration question a pattern in public debate that could be found on many issues: elite opinion makers selected a problem and a liberal policy solution, while grassroots opinion, unfocused and marginalized, ran strongly the other way.” The anti-populism of top-down elite control championed by Jewish intellectuals in earlier decades (Ch. 5 of CofC) had come to fruition.

Dealignment refers to the polarization of the electorate as voters abandon centrist politics in favor of more radical politics of both the left and the right largely in response to the divisiveness, alienation and cultural changes caused by multiracialism and White replacement.

Dealignment is basically the breakdown of the post-World War II political system in which power was traded between center-Left and center-Right parties, while Western societies drifted steadily toward cultural Leftism, bigger and more intrusive government, and the loss of sovereignty to globalization….The main factor behind dealignment is the increasing realization on the part of voters that there aren’t really any fundamental differences between the parties. There is no real competition. Instead, there is a political cartel. … The different branches of the establishment agree on all important matters. … A lot of people naïvely think that political power primarily means beating the other team in political contests, like elections. But there’s a deeper form of political power that determines all the things that the parties don’t fight about and that are never put to the choice of the voters. That’s real power. … Election after election, the people send their tribunes to the capitals, only to see them absorbed by the establishment. Thus when there is a conflict between the public interest and elite interests, it is impossible to believe that our representatives will side with the public. … [W]e are never allowed to simply vote for what we really want. (pp. 93–95)

Source: https://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/2021/03/28/white-identity-politics-by-greg-johnson-part-1-of-2/