Ukraine War: Did Russians kill other Russians? Is a Russian Officer admitting to Russian Incompetance and serious organisational problems?

[This is an interesting commentary and the source seems to genuinely be a Russian Officer. It seems as if in this so-called Age of Freech Speech (well, free speech for everyone except those who defend Whites and those who dare to point out the Jew scum and what they are up to); that there is a serious Russian presence on phones and social media where many Russians, even officers are speaking openly. I don't know if the 60% figure is correct. If it is, it is horrific. Even if 10% or 20% of Russian casualties were caused by friendly fire that would be very nasty. I assume the friendly fire they refer to is maybe artillery since most of the Ukraine War is artillery based. And that would be the kind of mistake that one could make without realising what you are doing wrong. It could be the result of lots of damage that the Russians have suffered, which has resulted in the new troops and commanders making mistakes. Even if the total is 10%, it is not good for morale. Jan]

Here’s the relevant excerpt:

Former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Security Minister and current DNR military commander Aleksandr Khodakovsky claimed on November 5 that Russian friendly fire may have caused up to 60% of total Russian losses since the end of Russian offensive operations in Mariupol in mid-May.[14] Even if this statistic is exaggerated, the fact that a Russian commander is publicly speculating on such a damning indicator of Russian and proxy competency indicates the deep challenges Russian forces face. Friendly fire typically does account for a limited number of losses in war but ordinarily nowhere near 60% of total casualties, which demonstrates a lack of communication and command and control coordination between Russian forces. Russian and Ukrainian sources also reported that a Russian rotation returning to its base near Pavlivka, Donetsk Oblast on November 5 drove into a ditch constructed by army subcontractors without prior discussion or warning, further demonstrating a widespread lack of cross-training and coordination between Russian troops.[15] The frequent replacement of Russian military leaders, promotion of inexperienced soldiers, and cobbled-together Russian force composition including Russian contract soldiers, Russian mobilized soldiers, DNR and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) forces, and Wagner Group forces exacerbate the fragmented nature of the Russian chain of command and ineffectiveness of Russian forces and likely contributes to frequent friendly fire incidents.

Source: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5